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Abstract. Vehicles of higher automation levels require the creation of
situation awareness. One important aspect of this situation awareness
is an understanding of the current risk of a driving situation. In this
work, we present a novel approach for the dynamic risk assessment of
driving situations based on images of a front stereo camera using deep
learning. To this end, we trained a deep neural network with recorded
monocular images, disparity maps and a risk metric for diverse traffic
scenes. Our approach can be used to create the aforementioned situation
awareness of vehicles of higher automation levels and can serve as a
heterogeneous channel to systems based on radar or lidar sensors that
are used traditionally for the calculation of risk metrics.
1 Introduction
The contribution of this paper is a novel method for the creation of situation
awareness regarding risk, i.e. dynamic risk assessment, from monocular im-
ages and disparity maps created from a stereo camera. Stereo cameras are widely
used in cars nowadays and can be considered as standard [16]. We trained a Con-
volutional Neural Network (CNN) with supervised learning to derive the risk of
a driving scene from an image of that particular scene. To achieve this, we first
created a data set of driving situations in a simulation environment and anno-
tated those situations with a risk metric. This data was then given as the input
to the learning process. After the training, the CNN was able to predict the
current risk of a driving situation from a camera input. This functionality can
be used as a part of vehicles of higher automation levels.
In general, there are two main approaches followed for achieving higher au-
tomation levels: The robotics approach [18] and the deep learning approach [2].
The robotics approach is more traditional and considers the vehicle as a combi-
nation of different functions realized by sensors, control logic and actuators. This
approach is the one followed mainly by the traditional car industry. The deep
learning approach is very different from that. It considers the vehicle as a black
box into which sensor information is fed, this information is processed by a neu-
ral network and control output as steering and throttle commands are generated
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by the network. This approach is the one mainly followed by new entries to the
automotive market. The neural network can be trained with millions of recorded
driving kilometers. The feasibility of the approach was shown in 1989 by a team
from CMU [13] and was repeated by a team from NVIDIA using the advances
of machine learning in 2016 [2]. Even though this approach is feasible, a huge
and open question arises towards its dependability. It is currently a hot topic
to try to understand what a neural network has learned and why decisions are
made the one way or the other [3]. However, reliable results on those questions
can probably not be expected by the time that car manufacturers want to have
realized highly automated vehicles.
The approach presented in this paper can be used in both paradigms for the
development of vehicles of higher automation levels presented above. The main
and currently considered use case lies in the robotic case, where it can be used
as an additional component of the functional architecture for performing a dy-
namic risk assessment. A further and future use case of our approach lies in the
field of making the output of a neural network more understandable and thus
analyzable. If the deep learning paradigm is used for achieving higher automa-
tion levels, the risk shall become an additional output of the neural network that
controls the vehicle. This allows making the output of the neural network more
transparent, as additional information about the network’s current understand-
ing of the environment is available. This understanding can then be plausibilized
and it can be checked if the predicted control commands of the neural network
match the predicted risk of the current driving scene.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we compare the presented
approach to the state-of-the-art, which is - as of today - only a single compara-
ble approach for the dynamic risk assessment based on images. Section 3 gives
details on our approach, the data collection and the training process. Section
4 gives the results of the training process and the achieved performance of our
approach. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
The approach related closest to ours, is the work presented in [20]. The goal of
this approach is - just as in ours - to train a Convolutional Neural Network to
perform dynamic risk assessment of traffic scenes from images of that particular
scene.
The authors of [20] used a subjective classification for the rating of traf-
fic scenes. They showed YouTube videos from collisions recorded by dashboard
cameras to three different subjects. These subjects then had to assign two time
labels for each video: t1 as the time at which the root cause for the accident
appears and t2 as the time at which this cause becomes obvious. This divides
the video into three sections: a normal, a caution and a warning section. The
CNN in their work was trained to assign one of those three labels to a given
image of a traffic scene. In our work we used a more objective measure to clas-
sify traffic scenes by the use of a quantitative and objective risk metric, as will
be explained in Section 3.4. By that, our network is solving a regression instead
of a classification problem. Conclusively, the approach presented in our work is
more systematic in creating the ground truth data for classifying traffic scenes.
In addition to the work in [20] more traditional approaches for risk assess-
ment that work with explicit trajectory predictions and the calculation of con-
flicts between trajectories can be considered as related work. A representative of
those approaches is described in [15]. The solution in this paper differs from the
traditional approaches for risk assessment as it follows an end-2-end paradigm
deriving the current risk directly from the camera input. Such an end-2-end
paradigm can result in a significant saving of computational costs. However, the
state of research is still too early to evaluate any claims of such kind.
3 Data Generation and Training of the CNN
3.1 Overview
Fig. 1. The architecture of our neural network for risk estimation in driving scenarios
The recent success of neural networks in almost all fields of Computer Vi-
sion has motivated us to address the problem of dynamic risk assessment with
a deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). Convolutional Neural Networks
are a special type of Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). While general ANNs
model a function as connected neural nodes of different layers, in CNNs these
connections are structured as convolutional filter kernels [12]. That means that
the connections between layers are very dense whereas the number of parameters
is kept relatively small because the connections share filter weights in a patch-
wise manner. In addition, modeling a neural network by multiple convolutions is
intuitively related to workflows of classical image processing. For example, some
kernels of the first two convolutional layers in a CNN can often be interpreted
as first and second order derivative filters [22], which are also commonly used in
classical edge detection. As framework for the design and training of our neural
network, we used TensorFlow (https://www.tensorflow.org/).
Since visual sensor data is available in most vehicles nowadays, we decided
to design the network in an end-to-end manner, i.e. the input is image data and
the output is the final risk estimate (cf. Figure 1). As others before, we wanted
to predict the output based on images from an onboard camera of a moving ve-
hicle. Consequently, our network architecture is inspired by the existing DAVE2
network [2] that is predicting steering commands for highly automated vehicles.
A full overview of the design is given in Figure 1. In detail, the network con-
sists of five convolutional layers and five fully connected layers. All layers except
the last one use Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) as activation function. Since we
used subsampled resolution of the input images, we did not need any spatial
pooling. As mentioned earlier, we provided a single image and a precomputed
disparity map as input for the network and stacked them into a single four chan-
nel tensor comparable to RGB-D images. More details on how these data was
generated is given in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4. The first three convolutional
layers use kernels of size 5× 5 with a stride of 2× 2. The last two convolutional
layers apply 3 × 3 kernels densely, i.e. the stride is 1. The first fully connected
layer after the flattened final convolution has 1.164 output nodes. All following
fully connected layers steadily reduce the number of neurons to a single output
node.
3.2 Simulation Environment
To train a CNN for dynamic risk assessment with supervised learning, a great
amount of training data was required. It is challenging to create this amount
of data in a real driving environment. Thus, we used a simulation environ-
ment to create sufficient training data. This environment needs to be large and
random enough to be representative for a real environment. For research pur-
poses, it is common to use computer games as a substitute for very expensive
professional simulation tools. In the past, efforts have been made to use the
TORCS game [4] for training neural networks to drive a car autonomously.
This simulation environment is open source but lacks a sufficient graphical
appearance and is limited to simulate driving situation on a race track. A
more suited candidate for a simulation environment was Grand Theft Auto
- V. With more than 500 vehicle models, urban and countryside road net-
works, and random actions of pedestrians and other drivers, it comes close to
an ideal simulation environment for autonomous vehicles. Although the game
is developed for commercial purposes, its publisher Rockstar Games has al-
lowed creative, non-commercial modification of the game under certain condi-
tions (https://support.rockstargames.com/hc/en-us/articles/200153756-Policy-
on-posting-copyrighted-Rockstar-Games-material). Existing work already shows
that data from this particular gaming environment is valid data for the bench-
marking of object classification algorithms [14]. Visual surveillance is another
application of commercial games as simulation environment for a serious pur-
pose [17]. During creating this work, an open-source simulator for autonomous
driving research named CARLA [5] was released. For future work we plan on
using this environment as it has almost the same benefits as GTA V only with a
smaller simulated world and it was designed for research purposes, which means
that the interface is easier to handle and the license is more open.
3.3 Creating Stereo-Images and Disparity
In order to determine the risk of a given situation from an image, the distance
of the objects - like other cars, pedestrians, etc. - in the scene to the vehicle
is essential. From a monocular image, it is very difficult to estimate these dis-
tances, since no 3D information is available. Cheap active sensors - such as depth
cameras - have difficulty to convince in automotive applications [21]. Thus, we
used a stereo camera, which has a left and a right camera. By computing the
shift in pixels between these two cameras, we got a disparity image. Disparity is
inversely proportional to the distance from the camera to the respective object.
We rendered the two images in such a way that both images lie on the same
plane and are horizontally aligned. With that, the corresponding image points
in the two images share the same horizontal line, which reduces the search space
from two to one dimension. For the computation of disparity several algorithm
exist. We choose the state-of-the-art Semi Global Matching (SGM) algorithm
[9] for our approach. SGM tries to find the best correspondences for all pixels
of one image so that a consistent and smooth disparity image is created. It uti-
lizes a semi-global energy formulation using eight different paths radiating from
each target pixel location. This enables sharp boundaries, accurate disparity es-
timation and fast run time. Because of occlusions, it is hard to recover disparity
for all image points. SGM uses a left-right consistency check for two computed
disparity images to localize and remove wrong values. Thus, SGM yields a non-
dense disparity image.
We created stereo images out of GTA V by simulating a standard stereo cam-
era. We virtually placed two custom cameras on the hood of a car with the
same orientation and same Y and Z-axis position. We kept the X-axis, i.e. the
horizontal position, 16cm apart, simulating the baseline of a stereo camera. For
consistency, we used the same car model for our data extraction process. We
rendered these custom cameras and automatically took screenshots to obtain
left and right images for computing disparity. GTA V allows only to render one
camera per frame. Thus, we first rendered the left camera, slowed down the
game to the lowest possible timescale, and then rendered the right camera in
the next frame. Hence, there was one frame delay in the two images. This delay
of one frame translated to a timely delay of 88 milliseconds. We used feature
matching to verify if the difference between the two images is as intended. This
was performed by matching ORB features [6] in both images and computing the
average difference in Y (vertical) and X (horizontal) direction of those identified
features for each image pair. Ideally, only a distance in X direction should exist.
The difference in Y direction should be zero. A difference in Y direction can
only happen because of the time delay between the images or the inaccuracies of
ORB matching. We classified image pairs with an average X difference less than
1 pixel, or average Y difference greater than 5 pixels as outliers. In the created
data set of 110.152 images around 3.5 % outliers were found and excluded. An
example of a disparity map created from a traffic scene is shown in the right
part of Figure 2. In this visualization of the disparity map yellow corresponds
to a close object and blue corresponds to an object farer away.
Fig. 2. Sample disparity map
3.4 Risk Metric
The recorded scenarios from the simulation environment were imported into a
Risk Metric Calculator (RMC) to determine the ground truth values for the
dynamic risk assessment. Risk metrics are used extensively for the creation of
situation awareness of active safety systems in the automotive domain. The ISO
standard for forward collision avoidance systems [10] uses thresholds of the met-
rics Time To Collision (TTC) and Enhanced Time To Collision (ETTC) to
decide if and if so which collision mitigation strategy shall be activated. Those
two metrics work with a very simple constant turn assumption for the lateral
movement and constant velocity (for TTC)/constant acceleration (for ETTC) as-
sumptions for the longitudinal movement. There exist more mature risk metrics
that use richer prediction models for the dynamic risk assessment, for example
[15] or [1]. The availability of such a great set of metrics with different limitations
and assumptions makes the choice of the right metric a difficult task. Feth et al.
[8] presents strategies on how to come to a valid decision regarding this aspect.
To get a deeper understanding and the possibility to compare the values of dif-
ferent risk metrics in traffic situations, we used a Risk Metric Calculator (RMC).
More detailed information on the RMC tool is available in [7]. The RMC takes
driving scenarios, either generated in the tool itself or given as a record from
the simulation environment, fills for every simulation step a grid map with the
relevant information and uses that grid map to calculate the selected risk met-
rics. Grid maps are a common notation in the robotics world. They discretize
the environment in cells of fixed or variable sizes. Each cell contains information
about its occupancy status. If it is occupied it may contain information about
the object that is occupying the cell. This map represents the World Model for
the robot, e.g. the vehicle, and is used to determine the appropriate behavior,
e.g. the desired trajectory. See [11] for related work on the subject and a more
recent approach for the creation of a grid map. In Figure 3 we illustrate how
an exemplary grid map for a specific driving scene in our approach looked like.
This grid map shows the cells that are currently occupied by the subject vehicle
(in the center of the map) and the vehicles in the vicinity in black color and
those cells that will be occupied in the next three seconds using a constant turn
and constant speed assumption in blue color. For efficiency reasons the occupied
cells are approximated by the ”border cells”. Cells within these borders are not
filled to keep the amount of entries in the grid map small. The horizontal and
vertical lines in the visualization have no meaning.
Fig. 3. Left: Scene from the simulation environment — Right: Corresponding grid map
For the development of our new approach, we decided to first use a very simple
risk metric. We investigated if we can train a Convolutional Neural Network to
predict this simple risk metric. The reason for choosing such a simple risk metric
first was the required amount of data. Usually, the risk metrics with more so-
phisticated prediction models have a lower false positive rate. That means that
for most traffic scenes they do not indicate any risk. Consequently, to achieve
the required amount of data we would have needed to increase drastically the
amount of training images in the simulation environment. The risk metric used
in this work is the reciprocal of the time headway metric.
time headway =
distance
subject velocity
(1)
The RMC calculated this metric by counting the least number of empty cells
between one vehicle and another vehicle and dividing that distance by the cur-
rent speed of the subject vehicle. By using the reciprocal of that value, we got
a positive relationship between the value of the metric and the current risk: the
higher the value of the metric, the higher the risk of the current driving situa-
tion. Only vehicles in front of the subject vehicle were considered. If there were
multiple other vehicles in the vicinity of the subject vehicle, the RMC considered
the closest vehicle only. The result was afterwards limited to a value of 20 to
exclude outliers and then normalized to a range between 0 and 1. See Figure 4
for an example of a driving situation that achieved a low value for the speci-
fied risk metric (0) and another driving situation that achieved a high value for
the specified risk metric (0.21). A value of 0.21 means that following a constant
speed and pessimistic turn assumption for the subject vehicle and assuming that
the target vehicle will not move at all, a crash would happen in 0.238 seconds.
The pessimistic turn assumption used here leads to a worst time headway metric
comparable to the worst time to collision metric presented in [19]. The actual
trajectory of neither the subject nor the target vehicle are considered in the
calculation of the metric. Again, the motivation for using this risk metric, which
obviously leads to a overestimation of the risk of driving situations, was the
needed effort in the production of a sufficient large set of training data and the
fact that this work shall be a proof of concept.
Fig. 4. Left: Uncritical scene (0) — Right: Critical scene (0.21)
Finally, this ground truth data was used as input for training the CNN. The
trained CNN is the result of this paper and our novel solution for dynamic risk
assessment for vehicles of higher automation levels by deep learning. Instead of
calculating the risk metric for a recorded driving scenario, this CNN can be used
together with a camera to perform a dynamic risk assessment of the driving
situation while driving.
3.5 Network Training
We used the TensorFlow framework for training. We built the network architec-
ture as discussed in Section 3.1 and trained the network using Adam optimizer
on the collected data. A total of 110.152 data points were recorded. After esti-
mating the quality using ORB as described in Section 3.3, we excluded outliers
and used the remaining 106.170 data points effectively in the training. This data
set consisted of the left image, the disparity information calculated from the
stereo image and the calculated risk value from the RMC tool. The network was
given the left monocular image and the disparity information as input and was
trained to predict the risk value as output. We divided the full data set into
three random groups. 70 % of the data was used for training, 10 % for validation
and 20 % was used for final testing. Training was performed for 30 epochs with
a batch size of 10. To avoid overfitting, validation test was performed after every
10 steps.
4 Results
The model was trained to minimize the mean squared error between true and
predicted risk values on the training data set. The mean squared error on the
training data set is referred to as training average error. Validation was per-
formed on the validation dataset and hence, its error is referred to as validation
average error. Likewise, testing error is referred to as testing average error. The
final testing average error we achieved over all test data was 0.01470. The val-
ues for training average error and validation average error are shown in Figures
5 and 6.
It can be seen from the curve of the training error in Figure 5, that the net-
Fig. 5. Training Average Error
work was able to learn an estimation of risk from the provided input data. The
Fig. 6. Validation Average Error
training error was steadily decreasing. However, a common pitfall for all machine
learning methods is overfitting. That means that the network loses the ability
to generalize to unknown input because it starts to create too strong connec-
tions between training input and output. Therefore, we monitored the validation
error in Figure 6 on a separate set of data. After half the iterations, i.e. after
approximately 15 epochs, the validation error started to increase. That is the
optimal point to stop training. As usual, overall performance of the network can
be increased by providing more, distinctive training data, though this implies
more training effort.
Figure 7 gives an exemplary impression of the performance of our CNN by
showing a driving situation for which the risk metric was predicted correctly by
the network (RMC value 0.36, network value 0.38) and a driving situation for
which the risk metric was not predicted correctly by the network (RMC value
0.75, network value 0.39).
For a better interpretation of the performance of the CNN we have to consider
the application in which it is used. A system for dynamic risk assessment needs
to classify the current situation as either critical or uncritical. The performance
of the network shall thus be rated according to its ability to correctly classify a
driving situation. Assuming a time headway value of 1.5 seconds as the thresh-
old, the complete effective data set of 106.170 situations contains 76.789 critical
driving situations. Of those 76.789 situations the CNN classified 67.052 correctly.
Table 1 gives the complete confusion matrix. With those values our approach
reached an accuracy of 72.87 %. From a functional safety perspective false
positives (FP) and false negatives (FN) are most relevant. The acceptable FP
and FN ratio are determined by the risk that follows from a wrong classification.
This depends on the application in which the dynamic risk assessment function-
ality is used. If the result of the dynamic risk assessment is used to trigger a very
critical driving maneuver, as for example an emergency brake, in an automated
driving system, the acceptable false positive rate is very low. If the result is used
to only trigger a visual driver warning, false negatives might be more critical but
still not too critical. Defining the target ratios is within the scope of functional
safety engineering and shall not be covered here. However, the values that we
achieve for our solution show that the integrity of the developed approach is still
far from what can be considered as usable in a safety-critical context.
Actual Critical Situation Actual Uncritical Situation
Predicted Critical Situation 67052 (63,16 %) 19069 (17,96 %)
Predicted Uncritical Situation 9737 (9,17 %) 10312 (9,71 %)
Table 1. Confusion Matrix of the CNN
We could identify a major reason for the bad performance of the network: The
view of the camera did not perfectly match the area that the RMC considered
in the calculation. Because of the that, the most critical situations according to
the RMC happened outside the view of the camera and could therefore not be
derived from the image. The example in Figure 7 illustrates this: On the left
image our CNN was most probably considering the vehicle on the left as the
closest vehicle. In the following, this vehicle was passed and on the right image,
it is right next to the subject vehicle but not visible for the camera. In the RMC
tool, this occluded vehicle was used for the calculation of the risk metric. How-
ever, the network was considering the vehicle in front. This vehicle was just as
far away as the vehicle on the image before, giving a reason why the same value
was predicted by the network as for the scene before.
With an accuracy value of 72.87 % our CNN does not perform significantly
better than the related work in [20]. The authors of [20] achieved a maximum
accuracy of 70.77 %. However, the classification of traffic situations in our work
is based on an objective risk metric instead of a subjective labeling.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel approach for the dynamic risk assessment
from images. To achieve this, we trained a Convolutional Neural Network with
data generated in a simulation environment and annotated with a simple risk
metric calculated in a risk metric calculation tool. We extended the simulation
environment with the capability to generate stereo images. From those stereo
images, disparity maps have been generated. We annotated monocular images
and the disparity maps with the reciprocal of the time headway risk metric. The
Fig. 7. Left: Value from RMC: 0.36 Value from CNN: 0.38 — Right: Value from RMC:
0.75 Value from CNN: 0.39
trained network achieved an accuracy of 72.87 % on our test set.
In the introduction of this paper we already pointed at the reliability challenge
of neural networks. Of course, the same holds for the CNN used in this paper.
Because of that, a system as recommended in this paper can only be used in
addition to more conservative systems for dynamic risk assessment. As we tran-
sition with higher automation levels from fail safe to fail operational systems,
measures for redundancy will be required. The CNN proposed in this paper can
be such a redundant system with a high degree of heterogeneity from conserva-
tive systems working with radar and lidar information. In parallel to this work
we currently investigate means to safely integrate systems for dynamic risk as-
sessment as presented in this work in the architecture of safety-critical systems.
For future work, we plan to go from the simple time headway risk metric to
a more sophisticated risk metric with a richer collision prediction model. This
will require enhancing the training data, as situations rated as critical will be
less likely. Further, we plan to use different network structures, as e.g. Long /
Short Term Memory (LSTM) Networks and compare the performance to the
base performance achieved in this paper. Once we achieve a sufficient perfor-
mance, the approach should be transferred from the simulation environment to
a real environment.
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